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Why Whistleblowers Lose: An Empirical and
Qualitative Analysis of State Court Cases
Nancy M Modesitt*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article was originally intended to be an analysis of the
propriety, or impropriety, of the doctrines most commonly used by courts
to decide employees' whistleblowing retaliation claims against
employers. However, upon conducting initial research, it quickly
became apparent that there was very little data available on
whistleblowing cases. Unlike employment discrimination cases, where
several empirical studies have been conducted, there is only one
empirical analysis of whistleblower claims, which focused solely on
outcomes in the federal administrative process for claims brought under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).l
That study revealed that
whistleblowers fare poorly for a number of reasons, but many of the
reasons suggested by the author appear to be unique to SOX plaintiffs. 2
This Article studies the success rates of whistleblowers suing under state
law, as different a context as possible from SOX, and identifies common
reasons whistleblower claims fail in these cases.
II. PERSPECTIVES ON WHISTLEBLOWERS

Legal

protections

for

whistleblowers

are

a

fairly

recent

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank Penny
Pether for her ceaseless support and willingness to read drafts of my work, my research assistants,
Erin Creech and Julie Hudnet, and the University of Baltimore for its ongoing support of my
research.
\. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why SarbanesOxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 65 (2007) [hereinafter Moberly,
Unfolfilled Expectations]. Professor Moberly revisited this study in 2012 and concluded that win
rates were still quite low. Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Whistleblower Provisions: Ten
Years Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Moberly, Ten Years Later].
2. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note I, at 100-20 (arguing that "procedural
hurdles" unique to Sarbanes-Oxley and the limited scope of protection under the act contribute to
low whistleblower success rates).
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phenomenon. 3 They have developed over the last century, resulting in a
multitude of sources of legal protection for whistleblowers. 4 More
recently, and on a nearly annual basis, Congress has enacted additional
protections for whistleblowers. 5 Research suggests that whistleblowers
play an important role in uncovering fraud, with indications that
whistleblowers in fact provide some of the most valuable information
about corporate fraud. 6 The current trend of legislative action has been
quite supportive of whistleblowers. This support, however, does not
mean that whistleblowers are able to report corporate wrongdoing with
impunity.
A. Employer and Regulator Responses to Whistleblowing

Even though there is legislative support for greater whistleblower
protections, it does not appear that employers share that sentiment. 7
While there has been some conflicting evidence regarding the extent of
retaliation against whistleblowers under SOX, 8 a recent study of
whistleblowing in corporations suggests that employees who blow the
whistle do not fare well professionally.9 This study considered situations
where corporate fraud was alleged involving U.S. companies between
1996 and 2004.10 Part of the analysis concerned the professional effects
of blowing the whistle for individuals who disclosed potential corporate

3. See generally DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW
OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 1-12 (2d ed. 2004) (describing the development of legal protections
for whistleblowers in the United States).
4. See id. apps. A-F (2d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2012) (listing hundreds of sources of legal
protections for whistleblowers).
5. See id. at 4-10 to 4-15 (Supp. 2012) (describing new protections such as the Dodd-Frank
Act, the National Transit Systems Security Act, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and
the Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act).
6. See Richard P. Nielsen, Whistle-Blowing Methods for Navigating Within and Helping
Reform Regulatory Institutions, 112 J. Bus. ETHICS 385, 385 (2013) ("There is a great deal of
evidence to suggest that whistle-blowing is one of the most important sources of information for
detecting and reducing illegal and unethical corporate behaviors.") (citing STEPHEN M. KOHN, THE
WHISTLEBLOWER'S HANDBOOK: A STEP-By-STEP GUIDE TO DOING WHAT'S RIGHT AND
PROTECTING YOURSELF (2011».
7. See, e.g., Eugenie Samuel Reich, Whistle-blower Claims His Accusations Cost Him His Job,
474 NATURE 140, 140 (2011) (describing how one researcher was given the choice of voluntarily
resigning or being fired after he raised concerns about the accuracy of his supervisor's research).
8. See Moberly, Ten Years Later, supra note 1, at 27-28 (describing varying empirical
evidence regarding retaliation against SOX whistleblowers).
9. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate
Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2240-45 (2010).
10. Id. at 2213.
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Outsiders fared significantly better than employees. 12
fraud. II
Journalists, for instance, were more likely to find better jobs after they
reported corporate fraud. 13 In contrast, 82% of employee whistleblowers
reported retaliation in the form of being fired, quitting under duress, or
suffering significantly altered employment responsibilities. 14 Many said,
"If I had to do it over again, I wouldn't.,,15 Employees were often forced
to change the industry in which they worked and the location in which
they lived in order to avoid harassment. 16
Numerous other researchers have found similar incidents of
professional retaliation, ranging from receiving poor performance
evaluations all the way up to being blacklisted in an entire industry.17
Other studies have found much lower rates of retaliation. For example,
the Ethics Resource Center's 2011 study of whistleblowers found that
22% of employees who reported misconduct suffered retaliation. 18
While these two studies report widely disparate rates of retaliation, even
if the reality is closer to the lower 22% rate, it means that nearly a quarter
of those who report their employer's wrongdoing suffer retaliation.
The prevalence of retaliation in these studies resonates with
anecdotal evidence regarding the effects of whistleblowing on
employees. C. Fred Alford's book, Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and
Organizational Power, details some of the consequences that arise in
19
The book begins with a
whistleblowers' personal lives.
whistleblower's description of how his life changed after reporting
misconduct: "I didn't just lose my job. I lost my house, and then I lost
my family.,,20 Similarly, when Roger Boisjoly exposed flaws in the
decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger, not only did his career
"end[] up in the toilet big time," he also suffered adverse health

11. Jd. at 2240-45.
12. See id. at 2231-48 (concluding employees suffer significantly more than auditors, analysts,
and journalists).
13. See id. at 2239-40.
14. Jd. at 2240.
15. Jd. at 2216.
16. Jd. at 2240, 2245.
17. See, e.g., Carmen R. Apaza & Yongjin Chang, What Makes Whistleblowing Effective:
Whistleblowing in Peru and South Korea, 13 PuB. INTEGRITY 113, 116 (2011).
18. 20J 1 National Business Ethics Survey: Workplace Ethics in Transition, ETHICS REs. CTR.
1, IS (2012), http://www.ethics.orginbes/fileslFinaINBES-web.pdf.
19. C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL POWER
(2001).
20. Jd. at I.
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consequences, including post-traumatic stress disorder. 21 Additionally,
whistleblowers can suffer fmancially both due to losing a job from
retaliation and costs associated with personal problems such as divorce. 22
It is not only corporations that react strongly to whistleblowers.
Even regulators can fail to react positively to whistleblowers due to
political pressure. 23 Historically, whistleblowers who exposed some of
the more egregious conduct of the government have been targeted. 24 For
example, Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon Papers to the press,
was prosecuted by the federal government. 25 Charges were only dropped
when it was revealed that government agents had broken into his
psychiatrist's office in an attempt to uncover damaging information
about him. 26 Coleen Rowley, who revealed failures within the FBI at
uncovering the 9/11 plot, was demoted and pushed out of the agency.27
Recently, the Obama Administration has responded to whistleblowing
with federal criminal charges of disclosing confidential information. 28
The Administration even fired a CIA whistleblower's spouse, who also
worked for the Agency, after the whistleblower made disclosures to the
public about missteps in the War on Terror. 29 The most recent
whistleblower to be targeted by the Administration is Edward J.
Snowden, who is the seventh individual indicted for leaking classified
information under this Administration. 3D But perhaps most tellingly, an
entire book has been written on how to "survive" being a whistleblower
with one full chapter devoted to describing the dangers whistleblowers

21. ROBERTA ANN JOHNSON, WHISTLEBLOWING: WHEN IT WORKS-AND WHY 36 (2003).
22. See Nielsen, supra note 6, at 389 (discussing that whistleblowing is frequently associated
with adverse career consequences leading to financial difficulty, marital strain, and ultimately
divorce).
23. See id. at 386-89 (noting that political actors under pressure can influence appointed
regulators to overlook whistleblowing cases).
24. See Lance DeHaven-Smith, Myth and Reality of Whistleblower Protections: Official
Behavior at the Top, \3 PUB. INTEGRITY 207, 212-15 (2011).
25. Id. at 212.
26. Id.

27. Id.
28. See Peter Van Buren, State of the Campaign Against Whistleblowers, CBS NEWS (Feb. 9,
2012, 2:35 PM), http://www.cbsnews.coml8301-215 _I 62-57374034/state-of-the-campaign-againstwhistleblowers/ (discussing the increased amount of charges brought under the Espionage Act by the
Obama administration).
29. Id.
30. See Scott Shane, Ex Contractor is Charged in Leaks on N.S.A. Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES
(June
21,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.coml20 J3/06/22/us/snowden -espionageact.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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face. 31
Why do so many employers and those with oversight authority react
negatively to whistleblowers? One leading plaintiffs' attorney in this
area of the law believes that employers' negative responses are due to
simple human nature. As Stephen Kohn states, "No one likes to be told
that she may have violated a law.,,32 In addition, there is evidence that
companies' corporate culture instills fear of reporting improper or illegal
behavior. 33 As noted above, a potential explanation for lack of
regulatory support for whistleblowers is that agencies bow to political
pressure?4 Another explanation is simply the lack of resources for the
investigation of whistleblower allegations. 35
While these problems may prevent some whistleblowers from
receiving a positive reaction within their company or from a regulatory
agency, in theory, a court's adjudication of whistleblower claims should
not be affected by these problems. Not being a part of the corporate
entity engaged in wrongdoing, a judge should be able to neutrally assess
the validity of a whistleblower's complaint. In addition, because of the
at least semi-independent nature of the judiciary, judges should be free
from the political pressures that affect agencies. While courts have
struggled with increasing dockets 36 and the concomitant limitation on
resources, they are not free to simply ignore the whistleblower cases that
arise. Thus, it would seem that the court system would be, at worst,
neutral for whistleblowers.

31. TOM DEVINE & TAREK F. MAASSARANI, THE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER'S SURVNAL
GUIDE 19-40 (2011) (explaining common methods of "Targeting Dissenters" and "Neutralizing
Dissent").
32. STEPHEN M. KOHN, THE WHISTLEBLOWER'S HANDBOOK: A STEP-~Y-STEP GUIDE TO
DOING WHAT'S RIGHT AND PROTECTING YOURSELF 19 (2011).

33. See id.
34. See Nielsen, supra note 6, at 388-89. An example of the effect politics has on agency
response is evident in the recent shift in the legal standards the Department of Labor applies to
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims. The current Administrative Review Board has overruled
Bush-era decisions in these cases. See, e.g., Zinn v. Am. Commercial Lines Inc., ARB No. 10-029,
2012 WL 1143309 (Dep't of Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. Mar. 28, 2012) (establishing new standards
applicable to Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims); Sylvester v. Parexel In!'1 LLC, ARB No. 07123,2011 WL 2165854 (Dep't of Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. May 25,2011).
35. See Nielson, supra note 6, at 386-87 (discussing lack of resources within regulatory
agencies devoted to investigating whistieblowing allegations).
36. See, e.g., JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2011 tbl.6.l, UNITED STATES COURTS (2011),
available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudiciaIFactsAndFigures/judicial-facts-figures2011.aspx (showing 266,783 civil and criminal cases filed in U.S. District Courts in 1990 compared
to 367,692 civil and criminal cases filed in 2011).
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B. Understanding Whistleblower Cases

Whistleblower cases present themselves in a myriad of forms. Cases
differ because not only are there federal and state statutes that afford
protection to whistleblowers, but there are also common law protections
available. 37 Most of the federal statutes are topic specific: that is, they
protect only whistleblowers who disclose an employer's misconduct
regarding a particular issue. 38 SOX, for example, protects employees
who disclose securities fraud as well as related wrongdoing. 39 There are
federal statutes protecting employees who disclose violations of federal
law relating to transportation, banking, nuclear power plants, health care,
and a host of other areas. 40 These statutes are primarily designed to
protect employees in the private sector. 41 The bulk of these federal
statutes require administrative exhaustion before the whistleblower can
bring suit in federal COurt. 42
Looking beyond federal protection, employees may also be protected
by state statutes. Some of these mirror federal statutes and are topic
specific.43
Others, however, are broadly worded and protect
whistleblowers who disclose a wide variety of wrongdoing. For
example, Minnesota has a whistleblower protection statute that protects
employees who report illegal activity, refuse to engage in illegal activity,
or testify regarding illegal activity.44 Despite the apparent breadth of
statutes such as Minnesota's, the majority of state statutes only protect
government employees, not employees in the private sector. 45
In addition to these statutory protections, nearly every state also
37. See WESTMAN & MODEsm, supra note 3, at 56-153 (describing various types of
protections available to whistleblowers in the public sector, private sector, and under common law).
38. See. e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2012) (providing protection for reporting violations of the
Atomic Energy Act). An exception is the Whistleblower Protection Act, which applies to all federal
employees. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1219,1221, 1222,3352 (2012).
39. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012).
40. See WESTMAN & MODEsm, supra note 3, app. C (listing various federal statutes that
protect whistleblowers).
41. See id.
42. See. e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012) (requiring a whistleblower to first file a complaint with
the Secretary of Labor to issue a final decision within 180 days prior to bringing an action in the
appropriate district court); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 3, app. C (listing
administrative requirements included in federal whistleblowing statutes).
43. See. e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:967-968 (2012) (protecting employees from
retaliation for reporting violations of law).
44. MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2013).
45. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 3, apps. A, B (2004 ed. & Supp. 2012) (listing state
whistleblower protection statutes, most of which concern exclusively public sector employees).
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recognizes a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.46
This common law tort claim provides recourse to employees who are
fired for a reason that violates public policy.47 The applicability of this
claim overlaps in some respects with state statutory whistleblower
protections. Typically, the common law claim includes protection for
employees who refuse to engage in unlawful activities as well as for
employees who report their employer's unlawful conduct. 48

C. Court Responses to Whistleblowing Plaintiffs
There is little data available on the outcomes of whistleblower claims
in federal or state courts. What is known about whistleblower claims is
nearly entirely anecdotal, but there are a few exceptions. First, Richard
Moberly conducted a study in 2007,49 which he updated in 2012,50 on the
outcomes of whistleblower claims brought under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. SOX whistleblowing claims must be brought first before the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), not in court. 5!
Professor Moberly initially assessed claims brought over a three-year
period and found that employees' claims succeeded a mere 3.6% of the
time before the initial administrative investigation within the OSHA and
succeeded only 6.5% of the time before an administrative law judge. 52
These low rates of success for whistleblowers did not improve over time.
In his 2012 update, Professor Moberley found that only 1.8% of
employee claims were successful at the OSHA investigation stage during
the first decade of SOx. 53
Based on his detailed analysis of the written decisions, Professor
Moberly identified several reasons for the low rates of plaintiff success.
One common reason employees lost was because they failed to file their
46. See id. at ch. 5 (discussing the ways in which the common law protects whistleblowers).
The wrongful discharge claim is not limited to whistleblowers; its coverage is broader and protects
employees who assert rights such as the right to receive worker's compensation. [d. at 112-13.
47. Id. at 95.
48. See, e.g., Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 421 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Neb. 1988)
("Consequently, an action for wrongful discharge lies only when an at-will employee acts in good
faith and upon reasonable cause in reporting his employer's suspected violation of the criminal
code.").
49. See Moberly, Unfolfilled Expectations, supra note 1.
50. See Moberly, Ten Years Later, supra note I.
S!. See 18 U.S.C. § I 514A(b) (2012) ("A person who alleges discharge or other discrimination
[under this Act) ... may seek relief ... by-filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor .... ").
52. Moberly, Unfolfilled Expectations, supra note 1, at 91.
53. Moberly, Ten Years Later, supra note 1, at 29.

172

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

claims in a timely manner. 54 Another reason for employees' low win rate
was based on statutory coverage: a significant number of employers were
found not to be covered by the whistleblower protection provisions of
SOX. 55 Additionally, Moberly found that whistleblower claims were
often unsuccessful because courts concluded that employees had not
engaged in protected behavior as defined by the Act. 56 Finally, Moberly
found that employees were often unable to provide sufficient evidence to
prove that whistleblowing was a contributing factor in the alleged
retaliation. 57
Moberly initially indicated that the sobering results of his research
might be partially due to the fact that Sarbanes-Oxley was a new statute,
and thus subsequent decisions, including those by district court judges,
might broaden the coverage of the Act beyond what the OSHA and
administrative judges initially provided. 58 However, in his 2012 article,
Moberly suggested that federal courts instead appear to be following the
narrow interpretations found in the original administrative decisions. 59
While Moberly's findings are not favorable for whistleblowers, the
apparently dire prospects for SOX plaintiffs may be mitigated by recent
changes in the composition of the Administrative Review Board
(ARB),60 which reviews the decisions of the administrative law judges
within the OSHA. Recent decisions by the ARB have reversed earlier
ARB decisions and have broadened coverage under the Sarbanes-Oxley
ACt. 61
While Moberly's research is thorough and its results are disturbing, it
is nearly impossible to generalize from his SOX research to other
whistleblower cases for several reasons. First, the cases Moberly studied
54. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note I, at 107.
55. Id. at 109-10.
56. Id. at 113-14.
57. Id. at 120--24.
58. See id. at 72 (stating that the strict legal scrutiny applied to employees' claims may be a
result of the "push and puIl of defining a new statute's legal boundaries"). Moberly's research
suggests that the administrative decisions were becoming more, not less, employer-favorable over
time. See Moberly, Unfullfilled Expectations, supra note I, at 91.
59. See Moberly, Ten Years Later, supra note I, at 33 (discussing the evidence of federal court
rulings that have deferred to the administrative judges' narrow reading of the Act).
60. See id. at 42 (noting that the Obama Administration appointed five new members to the
ARB's five-member panel in 2010 and 2011).
61. See, e.g., Spinner v. David Landau & Assocs., ARB No. 10-111, 10-115, 2012 WL
1999677, at *12 (Dep't of Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. May 31,2012); Zinn v. Am. Commercial Lines
Inc., ARB No. 10-029,2012 WL 1143309, at *4-5 (Dept. of Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. Mar. 28, 2012);
Sylvester v. Parexel Int'l LLC, ARB No. 07-123, 2011 WL 2165854, at *19 (Dept. of Labor Admin.
Rev. Bd. May 25, 2011).
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were decided within a federal agency, the Department of Labor. It is far
from certain that state administrative tribunals would come to similar
decisions, much less that state courts would reach similar outcomes.
Second, the cases were decided under one specifically-focused federal
statute-the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. As Moberly discovered, the OSHA
and administrative judges were interpreting this statute, with its focus on
exposing fraud within publicly held corporations, very narrowly.62 Such
narrow interpretations would seem to be less likely where the statute was
more generally worded to protect whistleblowers in a wide variety of
situations. Thus, extrapolating Moberly's results to state whistleblower
suits under either a common law theory of wrongful discharge or a
generalized statute protecting whistleblowers is questionable.
The other empirical study that tangentially involved whistleblowers
was conducted by David Benjamin Oppenheimer, who studied jury
verdicts in employment claims brought in Califomia. 63 The study
compared verdicts in employment discrimination cases with those in
wrongful discharge cases. 64 Oppenheimer concluded that plaintiffs won
wrongful discharge claims more frequently than employment
discrimination claims, although the difference was not statistically
significant. 65 There were a few interesting details that directly address
whistleblowers 'in this study. First, claims brought by whistleblowers
were more likely to result in a plaintiffs verdict than general wrongful
discharge claims. Whistleblowers obtained a favorable verdict 63% of
the time, as compared to 59% for all wrongful discharge claims and 50%
for employment discrimination claims. 66 Second, it appears that sex and
race may have had significant impact on the outcome of some
employment claims. According to the study, females who alleged sexual
discrimination and non-whites who alleged racial discrimination fared
worse than other types of employment claims in front of a jury.67
Because Professor Oppenheimer studied jury verdicts, his research did
not include information on how whistleblowers fared before reaching the

62. See Moberly, Unfolfilled Expectations, supra note 1, at 90.
63. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California
Employment Discrimination and WrongfUl Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for
Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 511 (2003).
64. Id. at 532-35.
65. Id. at 535 (reporting a verdict success rate for plaintiffs of 50% in statutory employment
discrimination cases and 59% in common law wrongful discharge claims).
66. Id. at 536, 538-39. Again, this difference is not statistically significant. Id. at 538.
67. Id. at 552.
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jury.68 Thus, it does not furnish information on the rates at which
whistleblower claims succeed.
These studies provide limited insight into how whistleblowers fare in
the legal system; Mobley's, because it is focused on a very narrow
statutory right and on federal administrative decision-makers, and
Oppenheimer's because the data on whistleblowers was limited to jury
verdicts.
D. Court Responses to Plaintiffs Bringing Other Claims

Because of the paucity of empirical studies on whistleblowers, it is
helpful to consider how plaintiffs fare in cases outside the
whistleblowing context. There are analyses of how employees outside of
the whistleblower context fare in litigation that provide data usable for
comparative purposes to explore whether whistleblowers succeed more
or less often than other employees. 69 Probably the most similar context
that has been studied involves outcomes in employment discrimination
cases. These cases present a comparator group of plaintiffs suing their
former employers, a similar setting to whistleblower litigation. The
central finding of these studies is that employment discrimination
plaintiffs do not fare particularly well. 70 In their seminal articles on the
topic, Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab determined that plaintiffs in
employment discrimination cases fared worse at both the trial level and
on appeal than other federal plaintiffs. 71
While their initial work was a number of years ago, Clermont and
Schwab recently updated their research on employment discrimination
success rates for plaintiffs in federal court and found the same patterns
persisting and, in some instances, becoming even worse.72 On appeal,
decisions and verdicts in favor of plaintiffs were reversed far more
frequently than those in favor of defendants. 73 Pretrial decisions in favor
of plaintiffs were reversed 30% of the time on appeal, while pretrial
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clennont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004) [hereinafter Clennont &
Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs].

70. /d.
71. /d. at 455-56.
72. See Kevin M. Clennont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'y REv. 103 (2009) [hereinafter Clermont &
Schwab, From Bad to Worse].
73. Id. at 110.
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decisions in favor of defendants were reversed in only 11% of cases. 74
When the plaintiff prevailed at trial, decisions were reversed on appeal
41 % of the time, while defendants who prevailed at trial were only
reversed 9% of the time. 75 The authors found these results particularly
disturbing because of the nature of employment discrimination claims,
where the outcome is fact-specific and focuses on the intent of the
defendant. 76 Clermont and Schwab concluded that there was an antiplaintiff effect in play.77 This effect was also seen at the district court
level, where employment discrimination plaintiffs prevailed in only 15%
of cases as contrasted with a win rate of 51 % for plaintiffs in other types
of cases. 78 Similarly, plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases won
at trial 28% of the time, which is far less often than plaintiffs in other
federal cases, who enjoyed a win rate of approximately 45%.79 In
general, plaintiffs in tort cases brought in state courts prevail at trial
approximately 50% of the time. 80
Based on the limited available research on whistleblowing and the
competing possibilities of outcomes akin to employment discrimination
litigation versus tort litigation, it seemed necessary to obtain additional
information on how whistle blowing plaintiffs fare in the legal system.
Do whistleblower plaintiffs have win rates similar to tort plaintiffs in
state courts, employment discrimination plaintiffs in federal courts, or
closer to what Moberly found in Sarbanes-Oxley administrative
tribunals?
III. RESEARCHING WHISTLEBLOWER CASES

This research is limited in scope. It is an initial look at a set of cases
from the first quarter of 2012 that are available on a commercial
database. This research is based on opinions taken from a commercial
database rather than data directly from state court systems for several
reasons. First, obtaining the data directly from court filings appeared to
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 127. These figures are for cases not resulting in a settlement.
Id. at 129.
See THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, TORT
BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 12-13 (2009), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfin?ty=pbdetail&iid=2132 (noting that the win rate at trial for plaintiffs
remained stabled between 1996 and 2005).
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be nearly impossible. 81 State courts do not have a uniform system of
coding the type of civil case filed, which presents difficulties in ensuring
82
accurate comparisons between cases brought in different states.
In
addition, whistleblower cases do not appear to be a category that is even
listed on some state cover sheets. 83 Thus, obtaining data directly from
state courts' systems on whistleblowers would require a researcher to
locate whistleblowing complaints in some states by reviewing all tort
filings-a prohibitively expensive and time-consuming process.
While it is my sense from having read hundreds of whistleblowing
cases in my career that the results of this research are generally
representative, it is not possible to determine whether the sample used in
this research is in fact representative of all state whistleblower cases.

A. Research Methodology
The cases in this study were obtained by conducting specific, datelimited, terms-and-connectors searches in a commercial database.
Results were reviewed, coded according to the type of retaliatory
conduct claim, and sorted into one of the following groups: (1) no
employment retaliation claim at all;84 (2) a retaliation claim brought
pursuant to a non-whistleblower statute (such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); or (3) a whistleblower claim brought pursuant to a
whistleblower protection statute or a whistleblower-retaliation claim
brought under the common law doctrine of wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy. Decisions from the third category were then
analyzed; decisions from the first two categories were not. 85

81. For example, Virginia does not have any category on its civil case cover sheet that identifies
an employment claim or a wrongful discharge claim. See COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, COVER
SHEET FOR FILING CIVIL ACTIONS, www.courts.state.va.us/forms/circuit/ccl416.pdf (last visited
Sept. I, 2013) [hereinafter VIRGINIA CIVIL COVER SHEET). California, in contrast, identifies
Employment as a broad category and wrongful termination as a subcategory. See CALIFORNIA
COURTS, CIVIL CASE COVER SHEET, www.courts.ca.gov/documents/cmOIO.pdf(last visited Sept. I,
2013).
82. This may be why many studies of outcomes in litigation use federal court cases-the
consistency of the federal cover sheet ensures consistent data across the country.
83. See, e.g., VIRGINIA CIVIL COVER SHEET, supra note 81.
84. Because the searches were word searches that required certain terms to be present in the
cases, it resulted in obtaining cases that used the terms but failed to involve an actual retaliation
claim made by an employee.
85. Decisions from the first category were irrelevant-these decisions happened to mention
terms in the search criteria but did not involve retaliation by an employer against an employee who
complained of wrongdoing. Decisions from the second category are relevant, but the majority of
them primarily involved employment discrimination claims with a retaliation claim appended. My
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This third group of cases was further narrowed to include only cases
where the court addressed the substance of a whistleblowing claim. A
number of cases involved discovery rulings or other non-substantive
issues such as whether an arbitration agreement should be enforced.
These cases were not analyzed because this research seeks an initial
sense of how courts react to the substance of whistleblowing claims.
Courts may rule on discovery issues substantively differently in
whistleblowing cases than in non-whistleblowing cases, but that is not
the focus of this research. For cases involving multiple claims, only
cases where a whistleblowing claim was substantively addressed in the
opinion were included in the data poo1.86 Thus, it is possible that in such
cases a lower court did address the substance of the whistleblowing
claim, but these earlier decisions were not a part of the data pool and
were not considered. Similarly, some whistleblowing claims from the
data may have subsequently been addressed on appeal; once again, these
were not included.
Once narrowed down to opinions in which the court addressed the
substance of the whistleblower claim, the cases were then coded
according to outcome. The outcomes included the plaintiff's win-loss
ratio as well as the manner of resolution (i.e. motion to dismiss granted,
summary judgment denied, or jury verdict upheld).
B. Results

There were a total of 34 cases in which the court opinion addressed
the substance of the whistleblower allegations. 87 The opinions were
concern with these cases is that state courts tend to incorporate Title VII retaliation doctrines, and
including these cases would mask outcomes and doctrines used in whistleblowing cases outside of
the Title VII context.
86. There were several cases that were wrongful discharge claims that did not involve
whistleblowers. These cases were not included in the final pool of cases.
87. Coombs v. 1.B. Hunt Transp, Inc., 388 S.W.3d 456 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012); Brown v. Cnty. of
L.A., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Paras v. Delta Dental of Cal., A131055, 2012 WL
629997 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2012); Luu v. Luu's Bros. Corp., No. C065408, 2012 WL 406908
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2012); Brown v. State Personnel Bd., No. F059897, 2012 WL 274349 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 27,2012); Morales v. Waste Mgmt. of Alameda Cnty., Inc., No. AI31130, 2012 WL
243231 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2012); Swindle v. Res-Care Cal., Inc., No. C062562, 2012 WL 86406
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11,2012); Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Cmty. Coli. Dist., \36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2012); Li Li v. Canberra Indus., 39 A.3d 789 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012); Cubilla v. Town of
Montville, No. KNLCV116010874S, 2012 WL 800909 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17,2012); Carlson v.
Sheriden Woods Health Care Ctr., No. HHDCY116025384S, 2012 WL 753756 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Feb. 14,2012); Conn. Dep't of Mental Health and Addiction Servs. v. Saeedi, No. CV116008678S,
2012 WL 695512 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2012); Kulmann v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., No.
NNHCYI06010414, 2012 WL 234218 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2012); Bollinger v. Fall River Rural

178

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

heavily weighted toward appellate decisions, as one would expect when
using a commercial database. Out of the 34 cases, 28 were decisions
issued by a court of appeals. Only 2 of these 28 appellate decisions were
issued by a state's highest court. The remaining 6 opinions were issued
by a trial court.
1. Rates of Success and Failure
While the vast majority of the opinions in the study were appellate
decisions, these decisions necessarily included the outcomes at the trial
level, making it possible to broadly analyze whistleblower success
rates. 88 Employers prevailed on the pending legal issue at the trial level
in 26 out of34 opinions, for a success rate of 76%.89 Only the appellate
decisions included the final disposition of the whistleblower cases at the
trial level. Out of the 28 appellate decisions, the employer prevailed at
the trial court level in the vast majority of cases, as indicated in 26 out of
Elec. Coop., Inc., 272 P.3d 1263 (Idaho 2012); Ulm v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 964 N.E.2d 632 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2012); Dysert v. Review Bd. of Dept. of Workforce Dev., No. 93A02-1105-EX-392, 2012 WL
10142 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2012); East v. Office of Inspector Gen., 87 So.3d 925 (La. Ct. App.
2012); Todd v. Kilpatrick, No. 300594, 2012 WL 470062 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); Stay v.
Connections Emp't Res., No. 301709, 2012 WL 407500 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2012); Wielen v.
City of Bay City, No. 298256, 2012 WL 407266 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2012); Vanderlaan v. Mich.
Med., P.C., No. 300660, 2012 WL 284580 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012); Prieskorn v. Univ. of
Mich. Health Sys., No. 298996, 2012 WL 205801 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2012); King v. Chrysler
Grp. LLC, No. 301246, 2012 WL 164202 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19,2012); Dooms v. First Home Say.
Bank, 376 S.W.3d 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); Teetor v. Dawson Pub. Power Disc., 808 N.W.2d 86
(Neb. Ct. App. 2012); Ainsworth v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. 56250,2012 WL 987222 (Nev.
March 20, 2012); Medina v. Dep't of Educ. of N.Y., No. 101823/2011,2012 WL 987601 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Feb. 15, 2012); Connolly v. Napoli, Kaiser & Bern, LLP, No. 105334/05,2012 WL 205961
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 2012); Pierce v. Atl. Grp., Inc., 724 S.E.2d 568 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012);
Williams v. City of Burns, No. M2010-02428-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 504511 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb.
15, 2012); Quinn-Glover v. Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. W2011-00100-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 120209
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2012); Nairn v. Killeen Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 S.W.3d 229 (Tex. App.
2012); S. Tex. Coil. v. Roberson, No. 13-10-00561-CV, 2012 WL 506324 (Tex. App. Feb. 16,
2012); Mullins v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 357 S.w.3d 182 (Tex. App. 2012).
88. The limitations of using cases contained in a commercial database become evident here.
Westlaw does not obtain all trial court decisions on motions to dismiss and on summary judgment; in
fact, it seems likely that a relatively small proportion of them are reported.
89. Coombs, 388 S.W.3d at 459; Paras, 2012 WL 629997, at *1; Luu, 2012 WL 406908, at *1;
Brown, 2012 WL 274349, at *1; Morales, 2012 WL 243231, at *1; Swindle, 2012 WL 86406, at *3;
Mize-Kurzman, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 265-66; Li Li, 39 A.3d at 791; Bollinger, 272 P.3d at 1266;
Ulm, 964 N.E.2d at 636; Dysert, 2012 WL 10142, at 3; East, 87 So.3d at 925; Todd, 2012 WL
470062, at *1; Stay, 2012 WL 407500, at *2; Wielen, 2012 WL 407266, at *1; Vanderlaan, 2012
WL 284580, at *1; Pries/wrn, 2012 WL 205801, at *1; King, 2012 WL 164202, at *1; Teetor, 808
N.W.2d at 89; Ainsworth, 2012 WL 987222, at *1; Pierce, 724 S.E.2d at 571; Williams, 2012 WL
504511, at *1; Quinn-Glover, 2012 WL 120209, at *1; Nairn, 366 S.W.3d at 236; Roberson, 2012
WL 506324, at *1; Mullins, 357 S.W.3d at 185.
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the 28 opllllons, for a success rate of 93%. This percentage may be
overstating employer success rates at the trial level. Out of the 28
appellate opinions, only 2 involved plaintiffs who prevailed at the trial
level; both were jury trials. 90 The only other way that a plaintiff prevails
at the trial level in whistleblower cases is for the plaintiff to settle the
case. These cases are not captured by this study. In 17 of the 34 cases
(50%), the trial court found in favor of the employer on a motion for
summary judgment (or equivalent) on the whistleblowing c1aim. 91 Four
out of the 34 cases (12%) went to a trial or administrative hearing-the
functional equivalent to a trial-in which the employer prevailed. 92 The
employer prevailed on a motion to dismiss (or demurrer) at the trial level
in the remaining 5 employer-favorable decisions out of the 34 cases
(15%).93
Employers also enjoyed significant success at the appellate level.
The overall affirmation rate of trial court decisions in favor of the
employer was 81% (21 out of 26 cases).94 The rates were similar
regardless of the type of trial court decision. Of the 17 summary
judgment decisions, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to the employer in 14 cases. 95 Thus, on summary

90. Brown, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 381; Dooms, 376 S.W.3d at 669. Additionally, another plaintiff
prevailed at an administrative hearing, which was confirmed in a subsequent district court decision
as included in whistleblower success rates below. Saeedi, 2012 WL 695512, at *13.
91. Coombs, 388 S.W.3d at 459; Paras, 2012 WL 629997, at *1; Morales, 2012 WL 243231, at
*1; Swindle, 2012 WL 86406, at *3; Li Li, 39 A.3d at 791; Bollinger, 272 P.3d at 1266; Vim, 964
N.E.2d at 636; Todd, 2012 WL 470062, at *1; Stay, 2012 WL 407500, at *2; Wie/en, 2012 WL
407266, at *1; Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580, at *1; Prieskorn, 2012 WL 205801, at *1; King, 2012
WL 164202, at *1; Teetor, 808 N.W.2d at 89; Ainsworth, 2012 WL 987222, at *1; Williams, 2012
WL 504511, at * 1; Nairn, 366 S.W.3d at 236.
92. Brown, 2012 WL 274349, at *1; Mize-Kurzman, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 265-66; Dysert, 2012
WL 10142, at *3; East, 87 So. 3d at 925.
93. Luu, 2012 WL 406908, at *1; Pierce, 724 S.E.2d at 571; Quinn-Glover, 2012 WL 120209,
at *1; Roberson, 2012 WL 506324, at *1; Mullins, 357 S.W.3d at 185. Both Roberson and Mullins
involved special pleas of immunity instead of traditional motions to dismiss.
94. Coombs, 388 S.W.3d at 464; Paras, 2012 WL 629997, at *1; Brown, 2012 WL 274349, at
*6; Morales, 2012 WL 243231, at *6; Swindle, 2012 WL 86406, at *9; Bollinger, 272 P.3d at 1274;
VIm, 964 N.E.2d at 645; Dysert, 2012 WL 10142, at *5; East, 87 So.3d at 929; Stay, 2012 WL
407500, at *5; Wielen, 2012 WL 407266, at *5; Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580, at *4; Prieskorn,
2012 WL 205801, at *4; King, 2012 WL 164202, at *5; Teetor, 808 N.W.2d at 95; Ainsworth, 2012
WL 987222, at *4; Pierce, 724 S.E.2d at 579; Quinn-Glover, 2012 WL 120209, at *7; Nairn, 366
S.W.3d at 251; Roberson, 2012 WL 506324, at *3; Mullins, 357 S.W.3d at 192.
95. Coombs, 388 S.W.3d at 464; Paras, 2012 WL 629997, at *1; Morales, 2012 WL 243231, at
*6; Swindle, 2012 WL 86406, at *9; Bollinger, 272 P.3d at 1274; Vim, 964 N.E.2d at 645; Stay,
2012 WL 407500, at *5; Wie/en, 2012 WL 407266, at *5; Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580, at *4;
Prieskorn, 2012 WL 205801, at *4; King, 2012 WL 164202, at *5; Teetor, 808 N.W.2d at 95;
Ainsworth, 2012 WL 987222, at *4; Nairn, 366 S.W.3d at 251.
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judgment motions, trial courts were affirmed in favor of employers 82%
of the time and reversed 18% of the time. The rates were similar for
cases decided on motions to dismiss. Four out of the 5 cases in which
the employer prevailed on a motion to dismiss were affirmed by the
appellate COurt96 (although in 2 of these cases the appellate court upheld
the dismissal of the whistleblower claim but remanded the cases to allow
the plaintiff to amend the complaint97 ). Appellate courts upheld 3 out of
the 4 decisions in which the employer prevailed at a trial or
administrative hearing. 98

Motion to Dismiss

RATES 99
Summary Judgment

Trial

15%

50%

12%

N/A

N/A

9%

TRIAL LEVEL SUCCESS

Employer
Prevailed

Employee
Prevailed 100

On the other side, employees succeeded on the merits of their
whistleblowing claims at the trial court level or administrative hearing

96. Pierce, 724 S.E.2d at 579; Quinn-Glover, 2012 WL 120209, at *7; Roberson, 2012 WL
506324, at *3; Mullins, 357 S.W.3d at 192.
97. Quinn-Glover, 2012 WL 120209, at *11; Roberson, 2012 WL 506324, at *4.
98. Brown, 2012 WL 274349, at *6; Dysert, 2012 WL 10142, at *5; East, 87 So.3d at 929.
99. It should be noted that the sample size for many of these categories is simply too small to
produce statistically significant outcomes. This chart indicates where a party prevailed on the merits
of the whistleblowing claim. The total percentages do not add up to 100 because of defendants'
losses on motions to dismiss and summary judgment. For these two groups of cases, it is not known
whether the defendant or plaintiff ultimately prevailed on the whistleblowing claim--only that the
defendant did not win on that particular motion.
100. Obviously there were no cases where a plaintiff won the case on a motion to dismiss. And
in this data pool, there were no cases where a plaintiff sought summary judgment on the
whistleblowing claim. Thus, the only manner in which plaintiffs prevailed was at trial.
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level in only 3 out of 34 cases, for an initial success rate of 9%. 101 Out of
the entire population of 34 cases, the employee prevailed on the pending
legal matter (motion to dismiss, summary judgment, verdict, or
administrative evidentiary finding) at the trial court level 8 times
(24%).102 In 4 of the 34 cases (12%) the employers' motions to
dismiss \03 were denied by the trial COurt. 104 There was I denial of a
motion for summary judgment included in the study. 105 Thus, it is
unknown whether the plaintiff ultimately prevailed on the
whistleblowing claim in these 5 cases.
It is to be expected that the only situation where the plaintiff
prevailed on the merits of the whistleblower claim was after a trial or its
equivalent. As is typical for a plaintiff in most litigation, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof in these cases, making decisions in favor of the
plaintiff at any preliminary stage of the case exceedingly unlikely.
Furthermore, it bears mentioning that it is possible that the total win rate
for plaintiffs is underrepresented in this study. Plaintiffs prevail before
trial by settling on favorable terms, and the database used in this study
only included reported decisions; it did not include settlements.
2. Comparative Analysis to Other Plaintiffs
It appears whistleblowers fare less favorably than tort plaintiffs
generally, as well as employment discrimination plaintiffs specifically.
This research indicates that plaintiffs in whistleblower cases prevail at a
rate of 9% at the trial or administrative hearing level. This is slightly less
than the 15% found by Clermont and Schwab for plaintiffs in

101. Brown v. Cnty. ofL.A., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380,385 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Conn. Dep't of
Mental Health and Addiction Servs. v. Saeedi, No. CY116008678S, 2012 WL 695512, at *13
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2012); Dooms v. First Home Say. Bank, 376 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Mo. Ct.
App.2012).
102. Brown, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 385; Cubilla v. Town of Montville, No. KNLCY116010874S,
2012 WL 800909, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17,2012); Carlson v. Sheri den Woods Health Care
Ctr., No. HDCY116025384S, 2012 WL 753756, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 2012); Saeedi,
2012 WL 695512, at *13; Kulmann v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., No. NNHCY106010414, 2012 WL
234218, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2012); Dooms, 376 S.W.3d at 669; Medina v. Dep't of Educ.
of N.Y., No. 101823/2011,2012 WL 987601, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 15,2012); Connolly v.
Napoli, Kaiser & Bern, LLP, No. 105334/05,2012 WL 205961, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13,2012).
103. One of the four was styled a motion to strike, but the substance was essentially that of a
motion to dismiss. Cub ilia, 2012 WL 800909, at *5.
104. /d.; Carlson, 2012 WL 753756, at *1; Kulmann, 2012 WL 234218, at *5; Medina, 2012 WL
987601, at *3.
105. Connolly, 2012 WL 205961, at *7.
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employment discrimination cases. 106 It also compares unfavorably to the
overall win rate of plaintiffs in litigation in general, where plaintiffs in
federal court prevail approximately 45% of the time, \07 and plaintiffs in
state court prevail about 50% of the time. 108 The plaintiffs in this
research at least prevailed slightly more often than the SOX
whistleblowers in Moberly's study, who prevailed at the administrative
level only 3.6% of the time, but at a rate of 6.5% before an
administrative law judge. \09 Out of the 7 total cases in this research that
went to trial or an administrative hearing, plaintiffs prevailed in 3, for a
success rate of 43%.1 \0 This compares unfavorably to Professor
Oppenheimer's study in which whistleblowing plaintiffs prevailed at trial
in 63% of cases. III
In terms of appellate review, appellate courts reversed decisions
made in favor of the employer in 5 out of 26 appellate cases for a rate of
19%.112 This is a slightly higher rate than Clermont and Schwab
discovered for employers in discrimination cases, where defendantfavorable outcomes at the trial and pretrial stage were reversed on appeal
only 10% of the time. I 13 Because Moberly did not address appellate
review, there is no comparable data from his SOX research. I 14

c.

Why Courts Deny Whistleblowers Relief

As noted above, this research is not intended to be a perfectly
representative sample of whistleblower cases. Instead, it is an attempt to
106. Clennont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 72, at 127.
107. Clennont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, supra note 69, at 442.
108. COHEN, supra note 80, at 13.
109. Moberly, Unfolfilled Expectations, supra note I, at 67.
110. Brown v. Cnty. of L.A., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Conn. Dep't of
Mental Health and Addiction Servs. v. Saeedi, No. CV116008678S, 2012 WL 695512, at *13
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7,2012); Dooms v. First Home Say. Bank, 376 S.W.3d 666, 669 (Mo. Ct.
App.2012).
III. Oppenheimer, supra note 63, at 538.
112. Luu v. Luu's Bros. Corp., No. C065408, 2012 WL 406908, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8,
2012); Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Cmty. Coli. Dist., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 259, 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012);
Li Li v. Canberra Indus., 39 A.3d 789, 796 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012); Todd v. Kilpatrick, No. 300594,
2012 WL 470062, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); Williams v. City of Bums, No. M2010-02428-COAR3-CV, 2012 WL 504511, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15,2012).
113. Clennont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 72, at 110. The table on page 110
shows that 1,133 out of 10,598 decisions in favor of employee at the pretrial stage were reversed on
appeal and 178 out of 2,042 decisions favorable to employees were reversed on appeal. Id.
Cumulatively, this means that 1,311 out of 12,640 trial court employer-favorable decisions were
reversed on appeal coming to a percentage of around 10%.
114. Moberly, Unfolfilled Expectations, supra note I, at 86-87.

2013]

WHY WHISTLEBLOWERS LOSE

183

gam a first sense of both the success rates for whistleblower cases
brought in state courts as well as the reasons for these rates of success.
The reasons for success or failure provide some depth and context to the
numerical analysis above.
Nearly all decisions reviewed in this research followed the approach
used in employment discrimination cases as to the quantum and type of
evidence a plaintiff must produce to proceed to trial. 115 The prima facie
case, which is the predominant method of proving retaliation for
engaging in whistleblowing, is typically articulated as follows. The
plaintiff must establish that: (1) she engaged in protected behavior, such
as reporting unlawful activity; (2) she was discriminated against; and (3)
there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the
discrimination. 116 Of these three requirements, the causal connection
was the one that produced the most difficulty for whistleblowing
plaintiffs, as discussed in detail below. 117
According to this research, even if the plaintiff produces sufficient
evidence of causation to establish the prima facie case, causation must
again be revisited, and once again it causes evidentiary problems for the
plaintiff. If the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the burden of
proof shifts, just as in employment discrimination cases, to the defendant
to articulate a legitimate reason for taking action against the plaintiff. 118
Once the employer has articulated its legitimate reason for taking the
action, the plaintiff can still prevail if she can establish that the stated
reason is a pretext. 119 This implicates causation because the case then
revolves around whether the employee was fired because of

115. A few do not follow this approach. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Burns, No. M2010-0248COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 504511, at *2 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15,2012) (noting that Tennessee has
expressly rejected the McDonnell Douglas framework). See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
116. See, e.g., Paras v. Delta Dental of Cal., No. A131055, 2012 WL 629997, at *6 (Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 27, 2012) (noting that California follows the McDonnell Douglas framework); Prieskorn
v. Univ. of Mich. Health Sys., No. 298996, 2012 WL 205801, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2012)
(following an equivalent Michigan standard).
117. This differs from Moberly's research, where coverage was a significant problem. Moberly,
Unfolfilled Expectations, supra note I, at 109-13. One would expect more plaintiff-favorable
outcomes than in Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims because employer-retaliation coverage was
not a significant issue in the whistleblowing cases in this research. However, the win rates were
fairly comparable at the trial level in my study (9%) and administrative law judge level (6.5%) in
Moberly's study. Id. at 91. This suggests' that there is something else driving the outcomes in
whistleblower cases and raises the possibility that regardless of rationale used by the court,
whistleblowers win rates will remain low.
118. See, e.g., Paras, 2012 WL 629997, at *6.
119. Id.
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whistleblowing or for some other, non-protected reason. The burden of
proving causation, whether as a part of the prima facie case or by
establishing pretext, was a significant problem for plaintiffs in the
sample of cases.
Out of the 34 total whistleblower cases, 15 involved analysis on the
cause of the adverse action taken, making it the predominant legal basis
for deciding whistleblowing cases in the sample. 120 Some of these cases
analyzed the causation issue as part of the prima facie case; others
addressed causation on the issue of pretext. Out of these 15 cases, the
trial court found against the plaintiff on the issue of causation 13 times
(87%).121 All of these 13 cases in which the trial court found that the
causal connection could not be established were summary judgment
decisions. Thus, these were situations where the trial court determined
as a matter of law, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not establish that the whistleblowing
behavior was the cause of the adverse employment action.
Inability to prove causation is the single largest reason that
whistleblowers lost their case. 122 This raises the question: Why do
employees lose on causation? Is it due to legal standards, poor job
performance, or a lack of evidence linking their protected activity to the
adverse employment action? To answer this question, I decided to look
beyond the numbers to assess the content of the court decisions in the
study. Specifically, I reviewed the text of the decisions as well as any
120. Paras, 2012 WL 629997, at *7; Morales v. Waste Mgmt. of Alameda Cnty., Inc., No.
A131130, 2012 WL 243231, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2012); Swindle v. Res-Care Cal., Inc., No.
C062562, 2012 WL 86406, at *4-8 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 11,2012); Li Li v. Canberra Indus., 39 A.3d
789,795 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012); Conn. Dep't of Mental Health and Addiction Servs. v. Saeedi, No.
CV116008678S, 2012 WL 695512, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2012); Bollinger v. Fall River
Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 272 P.3d 1263, 1271-72 (Idaho 2012); Todd v. Kilpatrick, No. 300594,
2012 WL 470062, at *6-7 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); Stay v. Connections Emp't Res., No. 301709,
2012 WL 407500, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2012); Wielen v. City of Bay City, No. 298256,
2012 WL 407266, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 9,2012); Vanderlaan v. Mich. Med., P.e., No. 300660,
2012 WL 284580, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 31,2012); Prieskorn, 2012 WL 205801, at *3-4; King
v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 301246, 2012 WL 164202, at *4-5 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2012);
Teetor v. Dawson Pub. Power Disc., 808 N.W.2d 86, 92-93 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012); Connolly v.
Napoli, Kaiser & Bern, LLP, No. 105334/05,2012 WL 205961, at *5-6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13,
2012); Williams, 2012 WL 504511, at *4-7.
121. Paras, 2012 WL 629997, at *7; Morales, 2012 WL 243231, at *3; Swindle v. Res-Care
Cal., Inc., No. C062562; 2012 WL 86406, at *3; Li Li, 39 A.3d at 792; Bollinger, 272 P.3d at 1268;
Todd, 2012 WL 470062, at *2; Stay, 2012 WL 407500, at *2; Wielen, 2012 WL 407266, at *1;
Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580, at *1; Prieskorn, 2012 WL 205801, at *1; King, 2012 WL 164202,
at * I; Teetor, 808 N. W.2d at 89; Williams, 2012 WL 504511, at * I.
122. This issue was similarly a problem that Moberly discovered in his analysis of plaintiffs in
Sarbanes-Oxley cases. See Moberly, Unfolfilled Expectations, supra note I, at 124-28.

2013]

WHY WHISTLEBLOWERS LOSE

185

available briefs filed by the parties on appeal. 123
The cases from the sample provide insight and help explain the
infrequency of plaintiff success. As discussed above, courts decided the
bulk of summary judgment motions against the plaintiffs based on the
court's belief that causation cannot be established as a matter of law.
Causation considers whether the employee was subject to adverse action
because she engaged in protected activity or for another, legitimate
reason. In situations where employees produced sufficient evidence of
pretext to withstand summary judgment, there appeared to be two factors
at play: (1) the court's articulation of the evidence necessary to establish
pretext; and (2) the court's willingness to ignore or dismiss out of hand
the employee's evidence that tends to disprove or cast doubt on the
employer's stated rationale for the adverse action taken against the
employee. 124
In the 13 cases where causation was decided against the plaintiff
(either in the prima facie case or in the analysis of pretext) at the trial
court level, 6 (46%) appear to involve trial courts making factual
determinations that should reside with the jury.125 In 3 out of the 13
cases (23%), the appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment. 126 This reversal rate was actually slightly higher
than the overall reversal rate for employers, which was 19%.
1.

Imposing a Causation Standard that is Unfavorable to Employees

Courts improperly granting summary judgment on causation create
an unfavorable standard employees struggle to overcome. Vanderlaan v.
Michigan Medical P. C. exemplifies both issues: legal standards on
causation that limit the ability of plaintiffs to succeed as well as
considering the facts in a light that is not favorable to the employee. 127
123. For the trial court decisions, briefs were not available.
124. This is in contravention of the legal standard for granting summary judgment, which
requires considering the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party (the employee-plaintiff). See, e.g., Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580, at *2 ('The trial court is not permitted to assess
credibility, or to determine facts on a motion for summary disposition." (citation omitted».
125. Many of these cases will be discussed below. Swindle v. Res-Care Cal., Inc., No. C062562,
2012 WL 86406 (Cal. App. Jan. 11, 2012); Wielen v. City of Bay City, No. 298256, 2012 WL
407266 (Mich. App. Feb. 9, 2012); Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580; Prieskom v. Univ. of Mich.
Health Sys., No. 298996, 2012 WL 205801 (Mich. App. Jan. 24, 2012); King v. Chrysler Grp. LLC,
No. 301246,2012 WL 164202 (Mich. App. Jan. 19,2012); Teetor v. Dawson Pub. Power Dist., 808
N.W.2d 86 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012).
126. Li Li, 39 A.3d at 796; Todd, 2012 WL 470062, at *7; Williams, 2012 WL 504511, at *1.
127. No. 300660,2012 WL 284580 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012).
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In Vanderlaan, the plaintiff articulated concerns that his employer was

not complying with federal law regarding billing practices in a medical
clinic and he was terminated a short time later. 128 The trial court granted
summary judgment, apparently based on a lack of evidence of a causal
connection between the plaintiff's protected activity and his
termination. 129 On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the
trial court's decision, stating that, "Plaintiff has presented no evidence,
other than temporal proximity, connecting his protected activity to his
termination. A short time period between plaintiff engaging in protected
activity and the termination of plaintiff's employment, without more, is
insufficient to establish a causal connection between the termination and
the protected acti vi ty. ,,130
Vanderlaan is not alone in its employer-favorable standards on
causation. Even temporal proximity coupled with a strong motive to fire
an employee who is making a protected report has been held to be
insufficient as a matter of law to establish the causal link when the
employer provided evidence of employee misbehavior on the job. 131
Along similar lines, temporal proximity coupled with evidence that the
employee had received positive employment evaluations before making a
report has been considered insufficient to establish that the employer's
stated reason for taking action is pretextua1. 132
Close temporal proximity between protected conduct and adverse
employment action should be sufficient to establish causation for the
purposes of establishing a prima facie case. Furthermore, there is
support for this proposition in whistleblowing cases brought under
federal law. For example, this standard of temporal proximity fulfilling
the prima facie case has been accepted for whistleblowing claims
128. Id. at *1.
129. Id. at *3.
130. Id.
131. See King v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 301246,2012 WL 164202, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan.
19,2012) (accepting the employer's articulated reason for firing the plaintiff in upholding summary
judgment for the employer); Plaintiff-Appellant's Reply Brief, King, 2012 WL 164202 (No.
301246),2011 WL 7627351 (arguing evidence of pretext through both temporal proximity and the
employee's report of wastewater overflow under a new policy that prohibited employees from
reporting such overflows to the government to protect the company from heightened scrutiny and
possible fines). The appellate court accepted the causation argument, but ruled for the defendant
because King failed to establish how his firing was pretextual. King, 2012 WL 164202, at *5.
132. See, e.g., reetor v. Dawson Pub. Power Dist., 808 N.W.2d 86, 92-93 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012).
In Teetor, the court determined that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of pretext
despite complaining about allegedly improper conduct. Id. The court focused on formal grievance
as the report of such conduct rather than the date on which the plaintiff initially protested the
improper conduct. /d.

2013]

WHY WHISTLEBLOWERS LOSE

187

brought under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 133
Once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case and introduces
evidence that casts doubt on the employer's explanation for its decision,
whistleblower claims should be handled no less favorably than
employment discrimination claims. 134 In both instances, the prima facie
case plus disproving evidence should be sufficient to allow the case to
reach the jury.
A recent decision involving wrongful discharge that was not a
whistleblower claim illustrates this approach. Shipp v. Mason General
Hospital Foundation, out of the Washington Court of Appeals, was
decided during the same time period as the cases in this study. 135 It was
not included in the pool of cases analyzed because the wrongful
discharge claim was brought by an employee who was fired for filing a
workers' compensation claim-the plaintiff did not engage in
whistleblowing. 136 The court overruled summary judgment in favor of
the employer and clarified the standard for granting summary judgment
on a retaliatory discharge claim.137 Borrowing from retaliation claims
brought under state anti-discrimination statutes, the court held that a
plaintiff may rely on the same evidence used to establish her prima facie
case to establish that the employer's stated reason for taking adverse
action is pretextual. 138 The court went on to note that an employer

133. See Zinn v. Am. Commercial Lines, ARB No. 10-029,2012 WL 1143309, at *7 (Dep't of
Labor Admin. Rev. Bd. Mar. 28, 2012) ("However, a temporal proximity of seven to eight months
between protected activity and adverse action may be sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that
the protected activity contributed to the adverse action."). See also Vieques Air Link, Inc. v. U.S.
Dep't of Labor, 437 F.3d 102, 109 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that ''the ALJ permissibly treated the
temporal proximity between the reports and the suspensions as sufficient to show the requisite causal
relationship").
134. Recent decisions under Sarbanes-Oxley take an even more employee-favorable approach,
holding that after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the
employer and remains there to establish that the employer would have taken the action regardless of
the whistleblowing behavior. See Zinn, 2012 WL 1143309, at *6. However, claims brought under
Sarbanes-Oxley are subject to the burdens of proof established in the Wendell H. Ford Investment
and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21). See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) (2012) (directing
the use of 49 U.S.C. § 42121). AIR 21 expressly provides that the employer must prove it would
have taken the action regardless of the employee's protected activity by clear and convincing
evidence. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012). Most state whistleblower statutes do not have
such a high standard for employers, making it questionable whether the Sarbanes-Oxley standard
should be adopted. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34.19-1 to -14 (West 2012) (containing no burdenshifting scheme); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304 (2012); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (2012).
135. No. 40647-I-II, 2012 WL 211654 (Wash. App. Jan. 24, 2012).
136. [d. at *2.
137. [d. at *5-7.
138. [d. at *7 (citing Milligan v. Thompson, 42 P.3d 418, 423 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002».

188

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

stating conflicting reasons for taking the action is sufficient to survive
summary judgment. 139
Given the low win rates of plaintiffs in whistleblowing cases, it
raises the question of whether the employee-favorable standard
articulated by the Washington Court of Appeals would have been the
same had the case involved whistleblowers instead of a worker's
compensation claimant.
2.

Viewing the Evidence in a Light Unfavorable to Employees

As for the evidentiary issue, Vanderlaan is also an example of how
courts tend to consider the evidence in a light that is unfavorable to
employees. In Vanderlaan, the court assessed the evidence-the
plaintiffs purported failure to submit to a psychiatric evaluation and
drug test-and considered whether the evidence warranted the plaintiffs
termination. 140 The court found that the plaintiffs evidence was
insufficient to establish causation. 141 Facially, perhaps, this evidence is
insufficient. However, the court failed to mention any of the evidence
that indicated that the defendant was requiring the plaintiff to submit to
the exam and test in retaliation for engaging in protected activity.142 In
other words, according to the plaintiff s evidence, the retaliation began
with the employer requiring the employee to undergo these activities.
Given the divergent evidence, summary judgment appears to have been
inappropriate.
Another example of a court's employer-favorable viewpoint is seen
in Prieskorn v. University of Michigan Health System. 143 In Prieskorn,
the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged for having complained of
patient safety violations and time-card fraud. l44 The trial court granted
summary disposition to the employer, concluding that there was no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a causal
139. Id. (citing Renz v. Spokane Eye Clinic, P.S., 60 P.3d 106, 112 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)).
140. Vanderlaan v. Mich. Med., P.C., No. 300660, 2012 WL 284580, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan.
31,2012).
141. Id.
142. See id. See also Appellant's Brief on Appeal, Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580 (No. 300660),
2011 WL 762335, at *17-22 (discussing the psychiatric exam and facts indicating that the request
was not justifiable). The court also stated that the plaintiff "inexplicably" refused to submit to a
psychiatric exam, which the defendant scheduled with a doctor of defendant's choice and gave
plaintiff only a 24-hour notice. Vanderlaan, 2012 WL 284580, at *3. It is difficult to imagine any
person agreeing to such a requirement.
143. No. 298996, 2012 WL 205801 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2012).
144. Id. at *1.
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connection between the employee's complaints and his tennination. 145
On appeal, the employee asserted that the timing of his tennination
combined with the fact that he had received a good employee evaluation
suggested that his tennination was due to his whistleblowing
complaints. 146 The appellate court disagreed. 147 It focused on the letter
terminating the plaintiff, which articulated other reasons for his firing. 148
This, however, should not be sufficient to establish lack of causation as a
matter of law; at best, it creates a second possible reason for the
tennination, and the detennination of which is correct should be left to
the fact-finder.
This is not to suggest that summary judgment is never properly
granted. While it is impossible to detennine as a matter of absolute
certainty whether a decision is correct based on the records available,
there are cases where summary judgment appears more appropriate than
those described above. For instance, in Morales v. Waste Management
of Alameda County it was undisputed that the plaintiff made statements
suggesting that he might engage in violent conduct-using a gun-in the
workplace. 149 The threat rose to the level of concern that the police were
called and a report was filed. 150 These statements violated the
defendant's zero tolerance policy on violence in the workplace, and the
plaintiff was discharged. 151
3. Narrowly Interpreting Statutes and Common Law Doctrines
In addition to granting summary judgment on a frequent basis to
defendants, there were a few instances of courts finding against plaintiffs
by narrowly interpreting whistleblower protection statutes. For example,
in Prieskorn, the court effectively narrowed the scope of the protected
conduct by determining that if the adverse employment action was based
on a supervisor's dislike of any complaining, rather than reacting to the
substance of the complaints, then the complaints were not protected

145. See id. Summary disposition is a mechanism to challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings
and to obtain what amounts to summary judgment. It differs from the federal motion to dismiss
because the court can consider depositions and other evidence beyond the complaint. Compare FED.
R. CIY. P. 12(b)(6), with MICH. CT. R. 2.l16(C)(10).
146. Prieskom, 2012 WL 205801, at *3.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. No. A13I130, 2012 WL243231, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2012).
150. Id. at *2.
151. Id. at *1-2.
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activity. 152 In that case, the plaintiff's deposition testimony suggested
that the firing was because the plaintiff's supervisor was tired of hearing
the plaintiff complain about a number of issues, some of which were
protected and some of which were not. 153 In other words, the court
appeared to indicate that so long as the supervisor was upset about the
complaining, not the substance of the complaints, it would not violate the
whistleblower protection statute to fire the plaintiff.
The flaw in this reasoning is as follows. First, if the complaints were
reports under the state's whistleblower protection statute and were part of
the reason for the termination, then regardless of the employer's
consideration of the substance of the complaint, the plaintiff was
engaging in protected activity.154 This fits within the plain meaning of
the statute. Furthermore, following the Prieskorn approach would allow
employers to circumvent the purpose of the statute by having a policy of
firing all employees who complain. 155
The cases also suggest that courts are narrowly interpreting what
constitutes a public policy sufficient to establish a common law claim for
wrongful (or retaliatory) discharge in violation of public policy. For
example, in Ulm v. Memorial Medical Center, the court determined that
no such claim is viable when the employee seeking relief is responsible
for ensuring compliance with the statute that is the source of public
policy.156 Thus, where an employee complains about a company's noncompliance with a statutory command, so long as compliance falls within
that employee's responsibilities, no wrongful discharge claim is

152. 2012 WL 205801, at *3.
153. [d. at *3 n.2.
154. See MICH. COMPo LAWS § 15.362 (2013) (stating that, "[a]n employer shall not discharge,
threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's compensation,
terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on
behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a
suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political
subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body ... " (emphasis added».
ISS. Cj. Collins v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1380-81 (N.D. Ga. 2004)
(stating that, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, where an employee made numerous complaints, some
of which were protected and some of which were not, summary judgment was inappropriate because
allowing an employer to rely upon the unprotected complaints would undermine the goals of the
whistleblower protection provision).
156. 964 N.E.2d 632,639 (111. App. Ct. 2012). For another similar example, see a/so Ainsworth
v. Newmont Mining Corp., No. 56250, 2012 WL 987222, at *3 (Nev. Mar. 20, 2012) (holding that
reports of illegal activity to a supervisor is not protected whistleblowing activity). On the other
hand, one case in the sample came out against the job duties exclusion and noted that "the entire
purpose of the [public policy] exception [to at-will employment] would be thwarted" if the exclusion
were adopted. Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Coop., 272 P.3d 1263, 1272 (Idaho 2012).
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allowed. '57 The court articulated its rationale as follows:
Whether plaintiff was adequately performing her job with respect to
defendant's compliance with laws ... is more a dispute for the parties
to resolve privately than a public matter justifying the courts'
involvement on behalf of the citizenry ... even thou~h the integrity of
essential health information may have been at stake. 1

The court's decision suffers from two failings. First, its articulation
of the issue-focusing on the plaintiffs job performance instead of
whether the employee complained about non-compliance-is
misleading. The issue of whether an employee was performing his or her
job is separate from the inquiry into whether the employee was faced
with the prospect of either personally violating the law or, through her
job, having a company violate the law. If the employee is truly not
performing her job properly, that inquiry would become a part of the
court's analysis of whether the employer had a legitimate reason for
taking adverse action against the employee. It should not be a part of the
court's analysis of whether a plaintiff has identified an appropriate
source of public policy. 159 Second, if the integrity of essential health
information is at stake, it is not merely a "private dispute" between the
employer and the employee. Those whose health information is at risk
are also interested parties, which brings the matter out of the purely
private realm and into the public interest realm.
Another example of narrow interpretation of whistleblower
protection is seen in one of the decisions in the sample that addressed the
intent requirement for an employee engaging in protected behavior. In
Ainsworth v. Newmont Mining Corp., the Nevada Sup,reme Court held
that in order to be protected, an employee "must affirmatively decide to
expose illegal or unsafe practices.,,'6o Employees, like the plaintiffs in
Ainsworth, who report employer conduct without knowing it is illegal
when they make the report are not· protected under the common law
wrongful discharge claim. 161
In Ainsworth, one of the plaintiffs was speaking with the Nevada

157. See Ulm, 964 N.E.2d at 639. Essentially, this imports the job duties exclusion I analyzed in
The Garcetti Virus, 80 U. eIN. L. REv. \37 (2011) into common law claims for wrongful discharge.
158. Ulm, 964 N.E.2d at 639.
159. For a detailed explanation of the flaws with the job duties exclusion, see Modesitt, supra
note 157.
160. No. 56250,2012 WL 987222, at *2 (Nev. March 20, 2012).
161. Id.
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Department of Environmental Protection (NDEP) about a construction
project. 162 The NDEP asked the plaintiff when plans would be submitted
for a "quench tank" that was required under the state's environmental
protection laws. 163 Plans for this quench tank were required to be filed
with the NDEP before construction began.l64 The plaintiff informed the
NDEP that construction on the quench tank had already begun, not
realizing at the time that the plans had to be filed before construction was
underway. 165 The plaintiff disclosed illegal activity but was not aware
that the conduct was illegal, and she was allegedly fired for doing SO.166
Where an employee exposes actual illegal conduct, not suspected illegal
conduct, even unwittingly, it is a sufficiently important public interest
that it should be protected. Indeed, it seems arguably more crucial to
protect these disclosures than situations where an employee reasonably
believes that the conduct is illegal but is mistaken-and these situations
are frequently protected by courtS. 167 If the employee is wrong, but has a
reasonable belief, there is no illegal conduct that needs to be exposed or
remedied. However, if the employee is right, even if the employee did
not intend to blow the whistle, there is still a direct social benefit to the
disclosure of wrongdoing.
D. Are Courts Hostile to Whistleblowers?

One of the most disturbing findings of this research is the indication
that whistleblowers in state court cases appear to be prevailing at a rate
that is only somewhat higher than the rate of SOX whistleblowers. It
was entirely unexpected, in part because Moberly's analysis of the
reasons for the low win rates in SOX cases focused primarily on factors
unique to Sarbanes-Oxley: narrow interpretations of the applicable
statutes of limitations, narrow interpretations of the employers covered
by the Act, narrow interpretations of the Act's protections, and
misapplications of the employee-friendly burden of proof. 168 Before

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

!d.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
167. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 3, apps. A, B (listing multiple state statutes where a
reasonable belief is protected).
168. See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 1, at 107-31 (discussing the narrow
interpretation of Sarbanes-Oxley's legal parameters and the legal rationales used when deciding in
favor of the employer).
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conducting the research, it was expected that, when not before a tribunal
hampered in the manner Moberly articulates, whistleblowers would
prevail at significantly higher rates than SOX whistleblowers.
Indeed, it was also anticipated that whistleblowers would prevail at
rates higher than employment discrimination plaintiffs. Whistleblowers,
it seemed, would be seen in a more positive light than employment
discrimination plaintiffs because of the well-publicized failures of
corporations to effectively police themselves 169 and the media's positive
portrayal of whistleblowers. Yet the similarity in outcomes seen in SOX
cases and this research suggest there is some commonality in how
decision-making parties view whistleblowers-and that the view is not
positive.
A common theme that might account for courts' apparent hostility to
employees in whistleblower cases is that courts dislike having to delve
into the minutia of the reasons for an employee's termination. Corporate
lawyers have used this by focusing attention on the business judgment
rule, suggesting that so long as the corporation articulates a facially
legitimate reason for taking adverse action against the plaintiff, courts
should respect and not second guess the corporate judgment.1?O As
articulated in an appellate brief filed by management, "Courts do not sit
as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the
business judgments made by employers, except to the extent that those
judgments involve intentional discrimination."l?! Directly addressing the
issue of pretext, one management attorney put it baldly, stating, "Plaintiff
may not simply question, or second guess, the soundness of [the
employer's] business judgment to show pretext. . .. '[A] fact-finder
need not, and indeed should not, evaluate whether a defendant's stated
purpose is unwise or unreasonable. ",172 These quotes and this doctrine

169. See, e.g., Phil Angelides, Chainnan, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's Autopsy of
Our Failed Financial System, Address at the University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review
Symposium: FCIC and the Crisis: Preventing the Next Financial Meltdown (Nov. 10,2011), in 80
UMKC L. REV. 949, 954-57 (2012) (explaining financial regulation failures were caused by an
incorrect belief that the financial industry could manage risks without a high level of public
oversight); L. Randall Wray, Global Financial Crisis: Causes, Bail-Out, Future Draft, 80 UMKC L.
REV. 1101, 1102 (2012) (discussing the failures of corporate governance caused by the move toward
self-regulation).
170. See, e.g., Brief of Appellees Dawson Pub. Power Dist. and Robert A. Heinz, Teetor v.
Dawson Pub. Power Dist., 808 NW.2d 86 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012) (No. A-I 1-00170), 2011 WL
2617947, at *3-5 (articulating laws regarding employers' rights to tenninate at-will employees for
good cause).
171. Id. at *4 (citing Elam v. Regions Fin. Corp., 601 F.3d 873, 881-82 (8th Cir. 2010)).
172. Defendant-Appellee's Brief on Appeal, King v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 301246,2012 WL
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are misleading in the context of whistleblower claims where the plaintiff
alleges pretext. The entire point of the plaintiff s argument is that the
stated reason for the adverse employment action is not valid; the court or
jury must assess the corporation's stated reasons and look behind the
articulated rationale. Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
there is sufficient evidence to justify disregarding the business judgment
rule-it should have no application in this context.
However, this dislike of playing the role of a super-human resources
department should, at worst, put whistleblowers in a position akin to
employment discrimination plaintiffs. It fails to account for the lower
success rates of whistleblowing plaintiffs.
Is it merely because
whistleblowers are still seen as snitches, despite the recently positive
media portrayals? Is it because whistleblowing plaintiffs have personal
characteristics that make them less likeable to judges? These questions
are important because even if the legal standards are brought into
alignment with causation in other contexts, if judges are predisposed
against whistleblowers, a purely legal correction may not solve the
problem.
IV. CONCLUSION

When I undertook this research, I understood from practitioners that
there was a sense that plaintiffs in whistleblowing cases do not fare
particularly well. My findings are a testament to that notion. Plaintiffs
in state court whistleblowing cases prevail at a rate well below that of
torts plaintiffs and more akin to the whistleblower plaintiffs studied by
Moberly under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act at the administrative level. The
biggest single reason for the failure of plaintiffs appears to lie within the
causation element of the claim. This research suggests that courts are
denying claims based on employer-favorable legal standards as well as
by considering the evidence in a light favorable to the employer.
However, this is an initial review of a set of cases raising the issue of
whether state courts are improperly denying relief to plaintiffs. It is not a
definitive study. Review and analysis of the current causation legal
standards that state courts across the country apply is necessary to
determine whether this is a broad problem or one limited to the
jurisdictions represented in the study.
164202 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 19,2012) (No. 301246), 2011 WL 7627350, at *25 (quoting DeMarco
v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 170-71 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Dubey v. Stroh Brewery Co.,
462 N.W.2d 758 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990))).

